The use of military force to forestall humanitarian crisis remains a controversial issue in international law. This strategy is considered antithetical to the sovereignty and territorial
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Introduction
Introduction the political turmoil in syria remains one of the most volatile and catastrophic phenomenon of the 21 st century. 1 this appraisal is drawn from the horrific statistics which indicate the conflict has left close to 100,000 civilians dead while displacing almost 9 million with most of them seeking refuge in the Middle east and europe. 2 in essence, this multifaceted conflict has fragmented the country along the fault 1 lines of religion, ethnicity and to some degree geopolitical interests. 3 On one hand, the government forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad are battling the western supported rebels informally known as "Free syria Movement" who are seeking to gain control of the country. Conversely, the ultra-fundamentalist islamic state (used interchangeably with isis and daesh) intends to establish a religious caliphate traversing the entire Middle east region. 4 this terror group has committed countless of violence against the yazidi women including sexual enslavement, honour killings and human trafficking. 5 Furthermore, its adherents are accused of perpetrating religious cleansing against minority Christians and plundering their property and holy sites. 6 throughout the course of the conflict the west has vilified President Assad as the principal perpetrator of the atrocities besetting the country. 7 this blanket condemnation prompted the North Atlantic treaty Organisation (NAtO) aligned states to shore up support for the rebels as strategy of expelling President Assad from office. 8 the Arab league followed suit by slapping syria with sanctions and demanding the immediate resignation of President Assad.
9 however, this indictment is biased and inconclusive after the united Nations (hereinafter the uN) prepared a comprehensive report which incriminated both sides for the atrocities. 10 On the opposite end of the spectrum russian President vladimir Putin has remained steadfast in supporting the regime. he has reiterated President Assad is the legitimate leader of syria and should be involved in any dispute resolution mechanism.
11 Furthermore, russia has vetoed any resolution by the security Council (used interchangeably with the council) seeking to invoke military intervention in Mah-rukh Ali, ISIS and Propaganda: How ISIS Exploits Women, reuters institute for the study of Journalism (2015) , available at http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/ files/research/files/isis%2520and%2520Propaganda-%2520how%2520isis%2520exploits%2520w omen.pdf. syria for fear of regime change. President Putin drew a perfect comparison with Libya where NAtO used humanitarian concerns as an excuse to dislodge Colonel Gaddafi from power only to leave behind a failed and fractured state.
12 subsequently, russia offered the regime military support in combating the rebels and jihadist who were determined to gain control of the country. this last resort measure has prompted the west to accuse Moscow of complicity to the alleged atrocities committed by the Assad regime. 13 however, in september 2015 this conflict took a totally different turn after russia became actively engaged in the conflict at the behest of the President Assad. the russian armed forces launched a series of surgical air strikes and deployed ground troops to reinforce the government forces in countering the islamic state.
14 After two years of vigorous battles isis was ultimately neutralised thereby enabling the regime to regain significant control of the country. in december 2017 President Putin made a victory tour of syria to commemorate the successful military campaign whereupon he announced the partial withdrawal of russian troops from the county. 15 Furthermore, he expressed his desire to mediate post-conflict reconciliation among the various factions in the country. 16 despite this self-evident triumph the west has viewed the russian support with suspicion of protecting its economic and geopolitical interests in the region.
17 some analysts argue russian support for the Assad regime is the precursor to the resumption of a "new cold war. "
18 Nonetheless, these concerns seem antiquated since russia has always advocated for a political and diplomatic solution to the conflict while strenuously opposing the use of force.
12
Jon Austin, US and NATO Want Syria to Be the Next Libya -Claims Assad and Putin "GOOD Guys" of Conflict, express, 2 August 2017 (Jun. 5, 2018) , available at https://www.express.co.uk/news/weird/836154/ syria-war-vladimir-Putin-russia-President-Assad-good-guys-Nato. 13 derek Averre & Lance davies, Russia, Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect: The Case of Syria, 91(4) international Affairs 813, 814 (2015) .
14 Marauhn 2013, at 414. 15 Nathan hodge, Putin Declares Victory in Surprise Stopover in Syria, wall street Journal, 11 december 2017 , available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-declares-victory-in-surprisestopover-in-syria-1512994876. 16 raf sanchez, Bashar Al-Assad Thanks Putin for "Saving Our Country" as Russian Leader Prepares for Talks on Ending Syrian War, the telegraph, 21 November 2017 , available at https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/21/bashar-al-assad-says-ready-syria-peace-talks-rare-meetingvladimir/. 17 Caitlyn A. Buckley, Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria, 5(2) Journal of strategic security 82, 83 (2012) . 18 Russia, Syria, and the "New Cold War," Journal of Middle eastern Politics and Policy, 18 december 2016 (Jun. 5, 2018) , available at http://jmepp.hkspublications.org/2016/12/18/syria-russia-new-cold-war/. Against Syria, 22 september 2013 , available at https://www.reuters.com/article/syria-crisis-russia/russia-says-opposesany-resolution-threatening-force-against-syria-idusL5N0hi0A020130922.
reuters staff, Russia Says Opposes Any Resolution Threatening Force
Looking at the bigger picture russian intervention in syrian falls well within the ambit of the right to Protect (used interchangeably with r2P) under international humanitarian law. this amorphous policy formulated in 2005 maps out the terrains of foreign humanitarian assistance during armed conflicts. 20 secondly, russian intervention safeguarded syria's sovereignty since it was undertaken at the behest of President Assad who is the de facto leader of the country. 21 in stark contrast the western countries decision to support the rebels was initiated in flippant disregard of principle of international law that prohibits illegal use of force against a sovereign state. 22 As the iCJ held in Nicaragua v. USA and DRC v. Uganda funding of armed resistance is tantamount to infringing upon a country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 23 As i shall argue the approach by NAtO raises serious legitimate issues regarding the culpability of the syrian rebels as active participants in the conflict.
this brief historical antecedent forms the focal point of this manuscript. Broadly speaking i argue the russian military support of the Assad regime falls well within the scope of the right to Protect. in contradistinction the western approach of supporting the rebels is blotted with serious legal ramifications in both international and humanitarian laws. this manuscript is divided into five major segments. the first portion underscores an elaborate discussion of the historical development of the doctrine of the right to Protect (r2P). it outlines the legal position of this doctrine in light of the ever changing dynamics of the international law. the second segment shall discuss the syrian conflict. this portion forms the main focus of this paper by expounding on the international humanitarian issues about the conflict. the third portion shall encompass a comprehensive discussion of the russian intervention in syria. Furthermore, it will give a brief synopsis of Putin's ascension to power and how his foreign policy transformed the geopolitical landscape. the fourth portion shall flesh out the fundamental distinction between the russian and western intervention in syria. Moreover, this segment shall discuss the jurisprudence on this subject matter as enunciated by the international Court of Justice (iCJ).
24 the fifth portion shall entail a general overview of the problem together with some concluding remarks from the author. samuel Mercier, The Legality of Russian Airstrike in Syria and "Intervention by Invitation," e-international relations, 29 April 2016 (Jun. 5, 2018) , available at http://www.e-ir.info/2016/04/29/the-legality-ofrussian-airstrikes-in-syria-and-intervention-by-invitation/.
22
Julian e. Barnes et al., Obama Proposes $500 Million to Aid Syrian Rebels, the wall street Journal, 26 June 2014 , available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-proposes-500-millionto-aid-syrian-rebels-1403813486. 
General Background on the Right to Protect (R2P)
The Pre-Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Era
By and large, international law enshrines the norms governing the relationship among nation states. this unique framework is largely attributed to hugo Grotius who popularised the term jus gentium (laws of the nation) which envisages a community nations posited within a common legal order.
25 this notion was later codified in 1648 when european powers signed the treaty of westphalia thereby ending the thirty years war.
26 this futuristic document laid the foundation for modern precepts of sovereignty and statehood by defining territorial integrity and state autonomy. 27 despite these tremendous steps interstate relationships were inundated with legal loopholes and frictions that erupted into world war i in 1914. 28 After the war the allied victors envisioned a new world order governed by the League of Nations.
29 however, this supranational organisation failed to realise its objective after europe relapsed into a diabolical arms race and annexations which triggered the outbreak of world war ii.
30 similarly, the ultimate defeat of the axis powers reshaped the international legal order after the allies lobbied for the formation of the united Nations (hereinafter the uN).
31 this global body succeeded the defunct League of Nations in overseeing the relationship among the member states.
32 this led to the promulgation of the united Nations Charter in 1945 which delineated the boundaries on the use of force by the member states.
33 Pursuant to Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the charter the use of force is restricted to the purpose of self-defense. 34 By narrowing this scope, the framers of the charter intended to safeguard the territorial integrity of the member states 25 harold hongju koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106(8) yale Law Journal 2559 , 2605 (1997 . 26 Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648 Westphalia, -1948 (1) American Journal of international Law 20, 22 (1948 35 eugene rostow noted these dual provisions chrystallised the use of force strictly for the purpose of self-defense as part of customary international law.
36 in addition to these clauses, the obligation to preserve international peace and stability was bestowed upon the security Council which comprised of the former allies powers during the war.
37
Aside from the uN Charter, the global human rights regime underwent a metamorphosis after the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention of Genocide and the Geneva Conventions on the Laws of war.
38 the spirit behind these futuristic documents was to prevent the recurrence of mass atrocities reminiscent of world war ii.
39 From another perspective, some scholars argue this legal change obligated third parties to avert genocide and other mass forms of mass atrocities. 40 the previous regime placed no legal obligation on foreign states to intervene during such scenarios thereby opening the leeway for autocrats to commit mass atrocities against helpless civilians the most striking example being the holocaust. 41 in spite of this transformative concrete framework and institutions there was a resurgence of incursions and barbarism as several uN members flouted the charter in pursuit of their geopolitical interests. A case in point was the Belgian invasion of the republic of Congo (kinshasa) after the secession of the mineral rich katanga region. 42 At face value Belgium justified its decision as means of preventing the ethnic cleansing and persecution of its civilians residing in katanga. however, this humanitarian measure morphed into a full blown civil war pitting the western backed katanga against the soviet supported African nationalist government led by Patrice Lumumba. 43 thereafter, this trend was replicated in three countries; india (east Pakistan) in 1971, tanzania (uganda) in 1978 and vietnam (kampuchea) 46 despite the perpetual discussion on this emotive subject the global community failed to reach a consensus on how to reconcile dynamics of international law with the demands of humanitarian protection thereby leaving a glaring lacuna on this subject matter. 53 the applicant applied for temporary halt of the airstrikes arguing they were illegal and calamitous under Art. 9 of the Genocide Convention. 54 in its cautious and one-dimensional verdict the court expressed "deep concerns" about the humanitarian tragedies in the region which raised "serious issues" of international law.
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
however, the thrust of the decision revolved around the preliminary objection raised by NAtO states which questioned the plaintiff's legal standing. the majority judges argued serbia and Montenegro lacked the locus standi to lodge the matter since they failed to meet the threshold of a uN member state as envisaged in Art. 35 of the iCJ Charter.
55 ensuing from this substantive technicality the court resolved that the applicant lacked the capacity to institute the proceedings and their case was summarily dismissed. Nonetheless, the applicants had a strong case since Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the uN Charter proscribes the use of force beyond the purview of self-defense contrary to NAtO's actions. 56 Furthermore, the court failed to issue legal guidelines on foreign intervention thereby de-escalating the dire humanitarian situation in the region and did not restore certainty on this subject matter for posterity purposes.
57 From another perspective, by failing to seal this legal lacuna the court opened the floodgates for individual member states to interpret the charter in accordance to their personal objectives. 58 this legal quandary was exposed after the u.s. led invasion of iraq to depose iraqi strongman saddam hussein who was accused of possessing weapons of Mass destruction and sponsoring terrorist organisations including Al-Qaeda. 59 if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a rwanda, to a srebrenica -to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? 62 secretary Annan's concern exposed the inextricable conflict between sovereignty and the use of force in protecting fundamental rights and freedom.
63 in hindsight, the framers of the uN Charter envisaged Arts. 2(4) and 51 as limiting the use of force to purposes of self-defense. 64 therefore, expanding this scope to encompass humanitarian interventions would trigger a paradigmatic shift in the international legal order. in order to harmonise this process the uN convened an ad hoc committee on the international Commission on intervention and state sovereignty (iCiss). this committee was comprised of seasoned experts in international humanitarian law who prepared a report that recommended a novel doctrine called the "responsibility to Protect. " 65 this proposal was deeply anchored in the laxity and reticence of the global community in addressing the genocides in former yugoslavia and rwanda.
66
At a glance this r2P stands on three major pillars as tools of averting civilian atrocities during armed conflict. 67 the first is the responsibility to prevent which entails tackling the root causes that may culminate in internal conflict. 68 this requirement intends to strike a balance between state sovereignty and humanitarian concerns by engaging the relevant stakeholders in redressing the dispute. this mechanism intended to cure the shortcoming of humanitarian intervention which solely relied on the unilateral use of force in redressing gross human rights abuses. Conversely, the responsibility to react empowers countries to respond to humanitarian concerns through various means including sanctions, international prosecution but resorting to military intervention only as the last option.
69 this proposal intended to offer viable options other than force in resolving armed conflict. Finally, the responsibility to rebuild underscores the duty to reconstruct countries torn apart by armed conflict through infrastructural development and post-conflict reconciliation. 70 in addition to these principal obligations r2P stands on precautionary principles on the use of force. ramesh thakur one of the foremost authorities in this subject and an iCiss committee member explains the use of force should be the last resort and not the tool of choice when confronting human rights atrocities.
71 therefore, these supplementary principles intend to protect the sanctity and integrity of r2P as a benign remedy to armed conflict. First is right intention principle which stipulates the primary obligation of the intervening state is to halt human suffering. second is the last resort principle which limits the use of military force as the measure of last resort. the third principle of proportional force prescribes the proportionate force at par with the nature and degree of the conflict. Finally, reasonable prospects principle which provides there for a proper assessment on the use of force to ensure that the consequences of the action does not outweigh the ultimate consequences of inaction.
72 the commission further recommended the permanent members of the security Council to craft the guidelines of enforcing the doctrine.
73 this resolution was subsequently adopted at the uN summit in 2005 but the divided security Council failed to delineate the concrete boundaries on the implementation of the principle. 74 Noteworthy, r2P is distinguishable from humanitarian intervention since its overarching objective is to protect civilians vulnerable to the atrocities of armed conflict 68 Grigaitė 2012.
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Id.
70
Id. rather than the determining the rights of intervening states. 75 Furthermore, r2P utilises a spectrum of mechanisms to redress conflict with the use of force being the last resort. in contradistinction humanitarian intervention gives utmost priority to using force in resolving gross violation of human rights. 76 Finally, ramesh thakur differentiates r2P from humanitarian intervention since it requires approval from the uN compared to the latter which is prone to unilateral initiative by the intervening country. 77 despite these changes there is legitimate concern the security Council may improvise the r2P doctrine into a tool for condemning weaker nations especially in the global south to the international Criminal Court (iCC). 78 secondly, the Libyan intervention demonstrated this doctrine may give preference to regime change rather to humanitarian concerns after NAtO instigated the downfall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.
79 this myopic and messy approach to the conflict left behind a failed state embroiled in sectarian violence, terrorist insurgency and human trafficking.
80 this failed Libyan experiment cast serious aspersions on this principle as budding concept in international humanitarian law thereby inhibiting its application in other jurisdictions like syria.
81 despite the obvious challenges the adoption of r2P played a significant role in charting the course towards redressing gross violation of human rights violation during armed conflict. world war i this vast empire collapsed and the League of Nations granted France the mandate rule over the syrian territory.
The Syrian Conflict
Brief History of Syria
83 this imperialist ruling ignited the nationalist armed struggle which led to independence in April 1946. 84 Nonetheless, this autonomy was momentary since the country was beset with both internal and external conflicts. domestically, the ruling Arab socialist Baath regime began crumbling under the weight of political infighting leading to a string coups and countercoups that ultimately propelled the Minister of defense hafez al-Assad into power.
85 despite being an Alawite minority hafez built an omnipotent political dynasty that dominated the country for decades.
86 externally, the country was entangled in endless and volatile conflicts with its arch-nemesis israel, a position which was aggravated by the humiliating defeat during the six day war.
87 however, Assad redeemed his image when the Arabs triumphed during the yom kippur war by forcing israel to cede the sinai Peninsula to egypt and thereafter peace accords at Camp david. 88 despite these challenges hafez cemented his iron fisted rule for 29 years until his death in 2000 when he was succeeded by his son Bashar. the introverted western oriented ophthalmologist became the polished image of a modern and reformed syria compared to his abrasive ultra conservative father.
89 during his first term he embarked on ambitious reforms including liberalising the economy, secularising the country and releasing political prisoners. 90 Nonetheless, these changes did not appease some factions leading to the resurgence of political dissidence supported by the western countries.
91 Noteworthy, the demographics of syria is that of a predominantly sunni Muslim country with significant pockets of shiite, Christian 92 despite this cultural and religious admixture the country managed to surmount the sectarian aggression and remained relatively peaceful compared to its neighbours.
Origins of the Syrian Civil War
On 17 december 2010 Mohamed Bouazizi young tunisian street vendor selfimmolated in defiance of the rampant corruption and repression that bedeviled the country.
93 what began as personal protest sparked off a radical wave of revolution that forced the long time tunisian autocrat Ben Ali to cede power and seek exile in saudi Arabia.
94 this movement later spread like wild fires across the entire Middle east region, leading to the downfall of long term rulers in egypt, Libya and yemen.
95 in the syrian context the trigger cause of the demonstrations is fraught with speculation and conspiracy theories. however, it is alleged the protests began after a group of juveniles' scrawled anti-government graffiti in the town of daraa.
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Another viewpoint argues the uprising was caused by a combination of sectarian violence and religious extremism fuelled by external forces. 97 Gradually, the clash between security forces and the demonstrators exploded into a full blown civil war that left close to 100,000 people dead and millions displaced with most of them migrating to europe.
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By and large, the western nations blamed President Assad for the atrocities while russia, China and iran remained highly skeptical of this sweeping indictment. 100 Furthermore, the uN prepared a comprehensive investigation report which confirmed the use of the chemical weapons but could not determine the perpetrator. 101 this incident was followed by a series recurrent gas attacks scattered across the country which led to the uk and France attributed to the regime.
102 this prompted President Obama to issue stern warning to the syrian government of "dire consequences" should it "cross the line. " 103 Conversely, russian leader vladimir Putin adopted a more objective and cautious approach by demanding independent and credible investigations by the uN into the alleged incidents.
104 this back and forth failed to avert the conflict which continued to claim more civilian casualties thereby prompting the human rights Council to classify the situation as "non-international armed conflict. " An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a state.
111
this implication of this conclusion means the parties to the conflict including the rebels are bound by humanitarian obligations as underscored in common Art. 3 of the Geneva conventions.
112 As Antonio Cassese notes the spirit behind the protocol is protecting the unarmed civilian population (non-combatants) from the atrocities of internal armed conflict by holding the participants accountable for their actions. Moreover, this obligation to avert the atrocities is non-derogable irrespective of whether the parties are non-signatories to the relevant conventions. 114 organized armed groups or between such groups within a state… international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there. it is well settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors are bound by international humanitarian law, even though only states may become parties to international treaties. 116 in the view of the foregoing legal principles the syrian rebels are equally culpable for the atrocities committed during the course of the conflict.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/ISIS/Islamic State/Daesh
the islamic state is a sadistic and ultra-fundamentalist group that intends to establish a salafist caliphate across the region. A comprehensive study carried out by the Brookings institution indicates the is is a caricature mini-state complete with rules and regulations defined by hard line Shariah law.
117 these archaic norms are built upon capital and corporal punishments which forced a majority of the civilians to flee northwards. Furthermore it is driven by gross misogyny that proscribes women from economic participation through destruction of businesses, markets and farms. 118 its' origin is attributed to the rogue Jordanian Mujahideen Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who commanded the Al-Qaeda faction in iraq.
119 After a string of guerilla and suicide bomb attacks on the u.s. and iraqi forces he merged the group together with other insurgencies to form the islamic state of iraq (isi). After Zarqawi was killed by a u. and eloquent cleric used his sublime oratory skills to recruit volunteers from across the world thereby creating a large militia which ultimately conquered the city of Mosul. 121 this expansion was subsequently aggravated by the Arab spring which left a significant power vacuum for encroachment into egypt, Libya and yemen.
122
After the syrian crisis, it operated through an affiliate organisation called "Al-Nusra Front" which later merged with isi to form the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis). 123 it is widely believed due to its' sunni underpinnings isis wanted to use syria as the platform for penetrating the impregnable shiite crescent of Lebanon and iran. 124 Apart from the ultra-religious fanaticism, isis is feared for its signature medieval barbarism which includes suicide bombings, beheading of infidels, enslaving women, public execution of sexual minorities and forceful conscription of child soldiers. the group is also blamed for the rape, enslavement, trafficking and honour killings of yazidi women and girls who are derided as unclean and sub-human.
125 surprisingly, the sinister and callous insurgent group continues to attract young volunteer fighters from across the world with most of them coming from western europe and Australia. 126 this international recruitment stands on the anti-western sentiments that engulfed the region after the u.s. led invasion of Afghanistan and iraq.
127 under the command of Baghdadi daesh unleashed brutal attacks on both the syrian army and civilians through suicide bombings and beheading of the state soldiers.
The Right to Protect and the Syrian Conflict
the syrian conflict presented a tough and awkward situation for the uN to implement the right of protect. Firstly, the contentious Libyan intervention had sullied the status of this doctrine after NAtO clamoured for the downfall and execution of Muammar Gaddafi. 128 this doctrine which was perceived as a travesty for regime change. 129 Furthermore, there was profound optimism post-Gaddafi Libya would evolve in the beacon of liberal democracy in the Arab world. however, this optimism turned ominous after the country disintegrated into a dystopian state haunted by terrorist insurgency, sectarian violence and human trafficking. 130 subsequently, when the security Council debated the resolution to intervene in syria, russia and China voted against the suggestion for fear of replicating the Libyan failure in the Middle east. these divergent viewpoints split the council right down the middle pitting the usA, France and uk supporting the rebel movement while russia and China affirming their support for the regime.
131 the latter states advocated for political and diplomatic solution that included President Assad being a legitimate stakeholder. they further argued military intervention would be analogous to infringing upon the sovereignty and domestic issues of syria.
132 however, after the terrorist attack in Paris, France on 13 November 2015 the uN security Council passed a resolution calling on the member states to take all necessary measures to avert future attacks by the islamic state.
133 this resolution known as "necessary measures" offered the council the wide latitude to use force against isis which posed an existential threat to global peace and stability. 134 however, since there was no consensus among the members of the security Council, each faction decided to tackle the problem in a manner that befitted their agenda.
The Russian Intervention in Syria
Brief Background of President Vladimir Putin's Ascension to Power
President vladimir Putin is one of the most enigmatic and dominant figure in contemporary global politics. the tough talking judo sensei began his career as a kGB agent stationed in dresden, east Germany during the Cold war. After the collapse of the soviet union he meandered his way through local politics rising to the level of deputy Mayor of his native city of st. career took a giant leap after he was appointed to head the russian intelligence, then renamed Federal security service of the russian Federation (FsB).
135 this position granted him leverage to forge strategic political networks that propelled him to the Premiership in August 1999 after the aging and ailing yeltsin anointed him as his successor. this political change offered russia the perfect window of opportunity to reclaim its international image in a unipolar world controlled by the usA. the yeltsin rapprochement with west had sacrificed at considerable expense russia's national pride and hegemony.
136 For example he abandoned the "parity doctrine" which forced russia to relinquish its nuclear rearmament ambition of being at par with the Americans. Furthermore, his ambition to remodel the economy around the western oriented free market system aggrieved both the nationalist and communist who lampooned him as the "America's yes man. "
137 At the turn of the millennium yeltsin resigned as President thereby paving way for Putin's leadership which intended to build russia's image on the geopolitical platform. 
Russia and Military Intervention
After world war ii the soviet union became one of the permanent members of the uN security Council. After the disintegration of the soviet union in 1991, russia inherited the soviet seat in the security Council with Boris yeltsin elected President.
139 Although yeltsin was ambivalent towards reinstating the russian geopolitical dominance, his successor was determined to forge strategic alliances with several countries in eastern europe, Asia and south America. upon embarking on this volatile mission Putin found himself ensnared in a geopolitical impasse with NAtO. this military organisation was aggressively expanding eastwards after engulfing significant portions of eastern european countries including Poland, hungary and Czech republic. 140 law obligation by invading and occupying a foreign sovereign state. More specifically, the western countries read mischief in russia's "peacekeeping efforts" after it supported the minority Abkhaz resistance against the Georgian army. 142 Nonetheless, the deployment of russian forces in the region was well within the international legal order as it was strictly restricted within the disputed regions. Furthermore, the Georgian intervention was the final resort after russia had relentlessly tried to engage all stakeholders in resolving the dispute diplomatically. 143 this geopolitical antagonism was exacerbated in 2013 after the Crimean region of ukraine held a referendum and unanimously voted to join the russian Federation.
144 however, the west ignored the underlying self-determination concern and viewed it as russia' annexation of ukraine.
145 this prompted President Obama and other western countries to impose the disingenuous sanctions against russia as countermeasure the Crimean "annexation. "
146 in 2014, the former American secretary of defense robert Gates labeled Putin the biggest threat to global stability who was determined to avenge the west for the collapse of soviet union.
147 he then proposed a continuum of stringent measures to constrain this objective including substituting russia as the biggest supplier of oil and gas in western europe.
148 despite the countervailing opposition from the NAtO Putin's leadership has reinstated russia as a force to reckon in the geopolitical landscape. with regards to the present conflict Moscow defended the Assad government arguing it was using proportionate force against armed militants targeting both civilians and public infrastructure.
151 Furthermore, russia was averse to any form of regime change arguing President Assad was the legitimate leader of the country.
152
this affirmation intended to avert the likelihood of replicate another Libya where NAtO used r2P as the perfect vehicle for regime change.
153 Consequently, the russian mission to the uN successfully vetoed a series of resolutions that intimated military intervention in syria. 154 A majority of these resolutions were geared towards punishing the government while conveniently overlooking the atrocities committed by the various rebel splinter groups. 155 in 2015 President Assad requested russian military and financial assistance in counteracting the incursion by domestic and foreign parties.
156 this military intervention was three dimensional in nature by pooling together air strikes, naval support in tartus and reinforcing the Arab syrian army with russian ground troops.
157 the russian military campaign became a success after aiding the regime in reclaiming the southern city of Aleppo from isis and rebels. 158 in this case the russian intervention fits neatly within the overall objectives of the right to Protect. in terms of Pillar 1 russia was firmly committed to addressing the root causes of the conflict by proposing a round table discussion among the various parties. this mechanism would have addressed the root causes of the conflict thereby curtailing the situation from culminating into a full blown civil war. however, due to the hard stance adopted by the west it was virtually implausible for parties to attempt this any reconciliation which led to other means including the use of force. Conversely, Pillar 2 demands capacity building as a means of deescalating the gross violation of human rights. 159 government should be supported to the point of assuming control whereupon those responsible for the atrocities should be held culpable. 160 Furthermore, this obligation demands spontaneous reaction to emancipate civilians from the atrocities of armed conflict. By supporting the syrian government russia bolstered the fight against isis and other radical groups responsible for the atrocities in the conflict thereby restoring normalcy in the country.
161 Pillar three entails the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation as means of restoring rule of law and normalcy after the conflict. President Putin has taken the personal initiative of mediating peace talks among the various warring factions as means of restoring peace and stability in the fractured country. however, there is legitimate concern his impartiality and objectivity may be clouded because of his close proximity to President Assad. 162 in spite of these concerns President Putin has reiterated his support for tripartite peace talks overseen by a third party including the uN. 163 in the same vein, russia's "invited intervention" respects syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity since it acted at the behest of the legitimate government.
164 this point is anchored on the fact that President Assad being the legitimate authority of the country should be supported in his quest to restore order. According to Jean d'Aspremont in his paper "Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of democracy" the legality of any government is determined from both internal and external perspectives.
165 internal factor imply the regime is duly recognised by the majority of the people who comply with its public policies and laws. Furthermore, a normative interpretation of this concept implies the ruler has the power to impose sanction on the norms and behavior of the subjects within its territories. 166 Conversely, the litmus test for determining external recognition is how the regime relates with the governments of other countries. in superimposing this school of thought in the syrian context, it is cogent to argue President Assad is 160 Alise Coen, R2P, Global Governance, and the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 19(8) international Journal of human rights 1044, 1047 (2015) . 161 Anshel Pfeffer, Two Years in Syria: Putin's Success Story, haaretz, 22 september 2017 , available at https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/two-years-in-syria-putin-s-success-marredby-ukrainian-debacle-1.5452162.
162
Assaad al-Achi, Russia's Syria Talks in Sochi are Destined for Failure, Al Jazeera, 26 January 2018 (Jun. 5, 2018), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/russia-syria-talks-sochi-destinedfailure-180126154408884.html. the legitimate leader. this is because he enjoys the unwavering support of the syrian people especially after his re-election in 2004 compared to the rebels and the islamic state who are relegated to their controlled territories. internationally, President Assad is widely regarded as the leader of the country by both his allies and adversaries. in light of the foregoing legal principles russia intervention cannot be classified as illegal use of force against a sovereign state.
Legal Consequences of Western Intervention in Syria
4.1. The Concern about Aggression and State Sovereignty the russian intervention in syria has been opposed especially the western countries who are determined to topple the Assad regime. however, a cursory glance of the NAtO led mission in syria demonstrates a false moral equivalence between Assad and isis as equal perpetrators of the conflict. this erroneous approach has prompted the west to support the rebels as the means of toppling the regime. however, this approach is tantamount to form of aggression against the sovereignty and integrity of the syria. in his opening address before the Nuremberg tribunal, former u.s. Attorney General and supreme Court Judge robert h. Jackson defined aggression to include:
Provision of support to armed bands formed in the territory of another state, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to take in its own territory measures in its power to deprive those bands all assistance or protection. 167 secondly, supporting the rebel movement instead of the regime is antithetical to the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity under international law. As Olivier Corten and vaios koutroulis note there is no general rule in international law that permits any state to support rebels in overthrowing a government, even if it is responsible for gross violation of human rights.
168 the Assad regime is the legitimate government of syria which pursuant to the uN Charter can only be attacked for purpose of self-defense purposes. No state shall organise, assist, foment, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in the civil strife in another state… every state has the inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another state… 169 in extrapolating this point to the r2P hideo yamagata observes it granted foreign states the power to support the host state in protecting the populace within its' territories unless there is compelling evidence of gross laxity or complicity to the atrocities.
170 in this case the lack of persuasive evidence of syrian government being complicit to the atrocities implies the intervening state has the duty to respect and preserve the sovereignty of host country.
By the same token the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity were well enunciated by the iCJ in Nicaragua v. USA. 171 in this case the socialist sandinista government of Nicaragua accused the usA of supporting and training renegade groups of right wing paramilitaries based in honduras called the contras. these groups launched systematic campaigns of civilian terror which caused widespread carnage and displacement. it was later alleged the contras had committed numerous atrocities including rape, torture, assassinations, civilian executions and displacement against perceived sandinista sympathisers. subsequently, Nicaragua argued by providing material and financial support to the contras, usA should be held liable for the atrocities. however, the u.s. raised a preliminary objection challenging the authority of the iCJ to adjudicate the matter. it argued the 1946 declaration of consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the court could not apply to the court. affairs of Nicaragua. the court responded in the affirmative by holding the usA responsible for interfering in the internal affairs of Nicaragua contrary to the uN Charter. the court went ahead and compartmentalised the nature of infringement into direct control and indirect control. Direct control applies the groups which are funded and controlled by a foreign state while indirect control pertains to groups that exercise a degree of autonomy. in the latter phase there must be sufficient evidence to prove the controlling state was in control and aware of the operations that culminated into the offences. in this case the contras fell within the second group and the usA could not be held culpable for their actions since it did not control their activities. By adopting this complex reasoning the court invoked such high standards that insulated the funding state from criminal liability of supporting armed movements in foreign jurisdictions. the usA being the commanding organ ought to have anticipated the likelihood of the contras using the funds, artilleries and tactics to commit atrocities against innocent Nicaraguans. in light of this verdict, there is an inextricable connection between the use of force and the doctrine of r2P since it defines the parameters of military purpose strictly for protecting the civilians. 174 however, if this sacrosanct objective is substituted with regime change then it nullifies the humanitarian purpose thereby necessitating from criminal sanctions.
in the Oil Platforms case the islamic republic of iran sued the united states for breach of sovereignty and freedom of commerce after the bombing its oil platforms near the coast of Bahrain.
175 the u.s. argued self-defense under Art. 51 of the uN Charter after two of its merchant vessels were allegedly sunk by iranian firepower within the vicinity of the Bahraini coast. the court held the u.s. reaction was unjustified since it failed to meet the threshold of necessity or self-defense under international law. however, the action did not amount to breach of freedom of commerce due to the inanimate existence of commercial relationship between the two countries which negated the claim for reparations. 176 this legal issue resurfaced in the Armed Activities case where the democratic republic of Congo (drC) lodged a memorial against uganda.
177 the gravamen of this dispute began when President Laurent desire kabila issued a moratorium demanding uganda and rwanda to withdraw all their troops stationed in the eastern border town of Goma. in retrospect, the latter two countries supported his armed struggle that led to the overthrow of longtime kleptocrat President Mobutu sese seko in 1997. Nonetheless, uganda defied this directive and deployed its troops to the western town of kitona then controlled by the anti-government MLC armed rebels. the drC further alleged uganda offered substantial material and military support to these insurgents who launched a string of armed operations seeking to overthrow the kabila government.
this sudden change in loyalty and friendship forced President kabila to solicit for military aid from his southern allies Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia whose swift onslaught quelled the rebellion and restored temporary normalcy in the country. After several peace talks and agreements the two countries reached a ceasefire and in 2003 uganda agreed to withdraw its troops from the Congo.
178 despite this accord the drC alleged uganda left behind "a complex network of warlords" along the border region of ituri which orchestrated military incursions and plundering of the vast mineral wealth.
179 it further averred these military actions amounted belligerent occupation and infringement upon its territorial integrity as envisaged by Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the uN Charter.
in response, uganda leveled similar accusation against the drC after state forces stormed its embassy in kinshasa, harassed the diplomatic staff and confiscated their personal belongings. uganda argued these actions were undertaken in flippant disregard of various provisions of the vienna Convention on diplomatic relations of 1961.
180 in the verdict, the majority of the judges held that uganda's military activities in the drC contravened Art. 2(4) of the uN Charter. 181 Conversely, uganda's counterclaim for self-defense was dismissed since the framers of the Charter never envisaged the applicability of Art. 51 after the occurrence of an armed attack. Furthermore, uganda failed to tender sufficient evidence of the legal and factual circumstances that would have warranted armed intervention.
182 By and large, the common thread of reasoning that runs through these landmark decisions is that customary international law prohibits the disproportionate use of force against a sovereign state except during self-defense. therefore, a similar argument can be raised against the inordinate use of force by NAtO states against syrian government. unlike the Nicaragua decision, there was profound optimism this judgement would encourage state parties to engage in diplomatic dispute resolution mechanism rather than armed conflict for fear legal repercussions like uganda.
193 similar obligation extends to the r2P whose principle objective is to safeguard the human rights during armed conflict. however, if any country not permitted by syria deploys troops or supports resistance intending to overthrow the Assad regime would be culpable of "belligerent occupation. " the principle requirement for this doctrine is the presence of troops on foreign soil and the ability of an occupying power to exert its authority over their activities.
Negligent Support of Rebels
By funding the armed rebels in syria to fight their "proxy war" with the Assad regime the western countries are susceptible for "negligent support" under international humanitarian law. Mojtaba Mahdavi amplifies this observation by noting the military assistance to the opposition forces turned the syrian spring into a proxy war and exacerbated an ugly and bloody civil war among ethnic and religious minorities.
194 this legal concept applies to countries that support armed insurgencies that are likely to cause unexpected violation of human rights.
195 this doctrine was enunciated in the Tadic case where the iCty grappled with the cardinal issue as to whether the Bosnian serb paramilitary militias were acting on behalf of Bosnia. the tribunal aptly observed:
…states are not allowed on the one hand to act de facto through individuals and on the other to disassociate themselves from such conduct when these individuals breach international law. 196 in juxtaposing this doctrine with the syrian context, it is cogent to argue the countries supporting the syrian rebels should be vicarious culpable for their actions. the states exercise a considerable degree of control by funding and training the rebels intending to overthrow the Assad regime. Judging by the volatile and antagonistic relationship among the parties to the conflict it is quite possible for the any foreign state to preempt the possible extermination of syrian civilians perceived as sympathisers to the regime. 
The Obligation to Protect Human Rights During Armed Conflict
On a more abstract level customary international law recognises the preventions of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression as jus cogens.
197 this means the obligation to prevent these atrocities cannot be shirked by any member states irrespective of whether they are signatories to their respective conventions. this principle was enunciated by in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons where the iCJ stated:
it is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and "elementary considerations of humanity" as the Court put it in its Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the Corfu Channel case (I. C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22) , that the hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules are to be observed by all states whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.
198
Against the backdrop of this quote, it is reasonable to argue the countries supporting the rebel movement are culpable of offenses should they be committed irrespective of their capacity and jurisdictions. this principle applies to the syrian situation is inherently skewed in favour of the regime fighting various rebel factions that does not nullify its status and obligation as participants in non-international conflict. , available at http://www.dphu.org/uploads/attachements/books/books_4008_0.pdf. when the Arab spring poured into Libya it morphed into an organised armed rebel movement in Benghazi seeking to oust Gaddafi from power. 203 this insurgency known as the rebel Council (rC) comprised of government defectors, disgruntled islamist militias and several political dissidents all of whom were supported by the west. the security Council passed resolutions number 1970 and 1973 informally known as "Operation unified Protector" as the blue print for military intervention. 204 Noteworthy, russia and China strenuously opposed military intervention against Libya citing it would be tantamount to infringing upon Libya's sovereignty. On the 15 April 2011 russian Foreign Minister sergei Lavrov reiterated the need for a political and diplomatic solution since uN lacked the mandate to initiate regime change. 205 this resolution provided for the alternative of military intervention by an international coalition incase diplomacy failed to remedy the situation. 206 in attempting to remedy the situation NAtO states issued a "no fly zone" in Libya and thereafter launched a series of airstrike against the Gaddafi forces. 207 this double edged approach was construed as a means of the r2P to prevent the civilian atrocities. Nonetheless, it turned ominous after the ultimate downfall and gruesome execution of Gaddafi by the rebels. however, a cursory glance of this doctrine as implemented by the NAtO countries was tarnished with undertones of "regime change" and to some degree the expansion of "western imperialism. " 208 this grim reality was confirmed after the u.s. secretary state hilary Clinton appeared on live television applauding Gaddafi's death by quipping "we came, we saw, he died!" this abnormal euphoria surrounding the humiliating downfall of Colonel Gaddafi confirmed suspicions that the intervention was driven by economic interests rather than humanitarian concerns. 210 in light of Pillar 3 of the r2P NAtO just like any other international stakeholder had the obligation to initiate post armed conflict reconciliation and reconstruction. 211 this duty would be instrumental in restoring harmony and the rule of law in a country that came apart under tribal and sectarian violence. But NAtO shirked this responsibility by failing to put in place concrete efforts to enhance reconstruction and reconciliation in the country. this obligation to rebuild is instrumental in restoring normalcy after the armed conflicts. 212 in Libya the downfall of Gaddafi left a volatile power vacuum which culminated into the socio economic disintegration, sectarian violence, human trafficking and terrorist insurgency. 213 As at 2015 the once prosperous nation was downgraded into a failed state with insurgence groups loyal to the islamic state controlling large swaths of the country. 214 this failure prompted russia to pour scorn over r2P as tool for redressing humanitarian concern in syria.
Concluding Remarks
in summary, the right to Protect (r2P) supports measures to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. 215 Nonetheless, its abysmal failure in Libya has resulted in widespread skepticism towards its viability in redressing humanitarian crises. 216 this uncertainty spurred russia to oppose its application in syria for fear of replicating into regime change and igniting into a full blown regional conflict.
Furthermore, the russian intervention in syria is bound to elicit mixed reactions across the geopolitical spectrum. On one hand, the west has considers it as the permutation of the cold war in the region with russia flexing its military muscles. Conversely, russian support has contributed to the sustenance of the Assad regime and the ultimate annihilation of the islamic state and rebels who threatened civilian welfare. Against this backdrop the overall objective of the intervention falls well within the purview of Pillar 2 of the r2P which intends to safeguard both national sovereignty and humanitarian welfare. 217 Furthermore, President Putin's commitment to ensure post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction is representative falls in line with Pillar 3 of the principle which demands restoration of the rule of law and normalcy.
in stark contrast, the NAtO intervention is beset with overtures of regime change after their repeated calls for overthrowing of the Assad regime. this position is augmented is by their overt support of the syrian rebels who are active participants in the conflict. As held in the Nicaragua v. USA and DRC v. Uganda cases this approach infringes on Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the uN Charter. in addition, there is inherent risk NAtO states will be held liable for the atrocities committed by the syrian rebels under the doctrine of "belligerent occupation. " in light of these divergent strategies and opinions it would be prudent for all the material stakeholders to adopt a more efficient and cohesive form of post-conflict resolution mechanism in restoring normalcy in the country.
